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Marketing measurement revolution: the C-OAR-SE
method and why it must replace psychometrics

Abstract
Purpose – New measures in marketing are invariably created by using a psychometric
approach based on Churchill’s (1979) “scale development” procedure. This paper
compares and contrasts Churchill’s procedure with Rossiter’s (2002b; 2010) contentvalidity approach to measurement, called C-OAR-SE.

Design/methodology approach – The comparison of the two procedures is by rational
argument and forms the theoretical first half of the paper. In the applied second half
of the paper, three recent articles from the Journal of Marketing that introduce new
constructs and measures are criticized and corrected from the C-OAR-SE perspective.

Findings – The C-OAR-SE method differs from Churchill’s method by arguing for (1)
total emphasis on achieving high content validity of the item(s) and answer scale –
without which nothing else matters; (2) use of single-item measures for “basic”
constructs and for the first-order components of “abstract” constructs; (3)
abandonment of the “reflective” measurement model, along with its associated
statistical techniques of factor analysis and coefficient alpha, arguing that all abstract
constructs must be measured as “formative”; and (4) abandonment of external
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validation methods, notably multitrait-multimethod analysis (MTMM) and structural
equation modeling (SEM), to be replaced by internal content-validation of the
measure itself. The C-OAR-SE method can be applied – as demonstrated in the last
part of the article – by any verbally intelligent researcher. However, less confident
researchers may need to seek the assistance of one or two colleagues who fully
understand the new method.

Practical implications – If a measure is not highly-content valid to begin with – and
none of the new measures in the JM articles criticized is highly content-valid – then
no subsequent psychometric properties can save it. Highly content-valid measures
are absolutely necessary for proper tests of theories and hypotheses, and for obtaining
trustworthy findings in marketing.

Originality/value – C-OAR-SE is completely original and Rossiter’s updated (2010)
version should be followed. C-OAR-SE is leading the necessary marketing
measurement revolution.

Keywords Construct definition, Content validity, Reliability, Marketing knowledge

Paper type Conceptual paper
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1. Introduction
Marketing knowledge, which consists of strategic principles, planning
frameworks, and generalizations from empirical findings – (see Rossiter, 2001, 2002a),
depends on – and indeed takes as a given – that the constructs involved have been
validly measured. Valid measures are assumed to be produced if researchers follow
and meet the criteria spelled out in Churchill’s (1979) “scale-development” procedure,
which is based on Nunnally’s (1978) version of psychometric theory. However,
Churchill’s method is dangerously misleading because it bypasses the first and
fundamental requirement of the measure – content validity – and researchers
following it try to “prop up” and justify low content-valid measures by claiming that
the scores from these measures meet widely agreed statistical criteria. The measure is
then assumed by researchers to be “valid” because it produces scores that have “good
psychometric properties,” all the while forgetting to ensure that the measure was
content-valid to begin with. Typical examples of this cavalier (and unscientific)
practice in our leading journal, the Journal of Marketing, are given in the second half
of this article. The purpose of these critiques of psychometrically trained researchers’
work is to dramatize the need for a complete “revolution” in marketing measurement.
Leading this revolution is the C-OAR-SE method (see Rossiter, 2002b, 2005,
2007, 2008, 2009a, and 2010). C-OAR-SE is an acronym for its six procedural steps of
Construct definition, Object representation, Attribute classification, Rater-entity
identification, Scale (item type and answer format) selection, and Enumeration
(scoring). C-OAR-SE is based on expert content-validation and does not use
psychometrics or statistics.
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The first part of the article argues in detail that the C-OAR-SE approach to
measurement is incompatible with Churchill’s approach and proves rationally that
C-OAR-SE should be used instead. The first table in the article provides a side-byside comparison of Churchill’s (1979) measure-development procedure and the
updated C-OAR-SE procedure (see Rossiter’s 2010 book – although the main updates
are summarized in the present article). An explanation of the main differences
between the two methods is given in the accompanying text. The C-OAR-SE measure
evaluation criteria are then reviewed as a prelude to the second part of the article,
which scrutinizes the definitions and measures of new constructs in recent JM articles
from the C-OAR-SE perspective. The objective purpose of the critiques is to
demonstrate how marketing knowledge is misleadingly inferred when low contentvalid measures are employed. The subjective purpose, as mentioned, is to give young
researchers the confidence to adopt C-OAR-SE and lead a measurement revolution.

2. Comparison of the Churchill and C-OAR-SE procedures

2.1 Different focus of the two procedures
Understanding of the major difference in focus of the two measurement
procedures is helped considerably if you first look at the general structure-ofmeasurement model (see Figure 1). This model reveals the crucial difference in the
coverage of the two procedures and also reveals the source of the problems with
conventional psychometrics. Churchill’s procedure (and likewise Nunnally’s 1978
procedure) covers only the “back end” (M → S) of this Construct → Measure → Score
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model – it attempts to validate the measure, M, by the scores, S, that it produces. In
Churchill’s theory of measurement, as in Nunnally’s, the measure is regarded as
“validated” if it yields scores that correlate highly with scores from another measure
of the construct (convergent validity) but at the same time yields scores that do not
correlate significantly with scores from a measure of another construct (discriminant
validity). Churchill (1979), as does Nunnally (1978), refers to this convergent and
divergent correlational procedure as establishing “construct validity.” However, the
construct, C, is in fact ignored, because the focus is on M and S only.

Figure 1 here

In the C-OAR-SE theory of measurement, a measure’s scores are completely
irrelevant to establishing the measure’s validity (as too are all empirical or statistical
tests). In C-OAR-SE, the validity of the measure is established solely by rational
analysis – performable, for all but the deepest psychological constructs rarely used in
marketing, by any verbally intelligent expert speaker of the language or, for less
confident researchers or those who are not native speakers of the language in the
measure, by enlisting the aid of one or two verbally intelligent expert speakers – of
the semantic correspondence between the construct, C, as defined by the researcher, and
the measure, M. The focus in C-OAR-SE is on C and M only. This rational analysis
must demonstrate high content validity for the measure. Otherwise, the measure must
not be used. What happens all too often at present with researchers who use
Churchill’s (or Nunnally’s) procedure, as explained later in this article, is that items
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are added or dropped until the “alpha” is pushed up high enough to justify use of the
measure. Incidentally, it is hardly ever at the α = .80 minimum to .95 maximum as
recommended by Nunnally (1978, pp. 245-246) for a “final” measure. For example,
all three studies criticized later in this article used multiple-item measures with alphas
below .80. In C-OAR-SE, the “alpha” of the measure is irrelevant. No ex post
statistical manipulations of the items’ scores can compensate for low content validity
of the measure.
The focus of C-OAR-SE theory is thus on the “front end” (C → M) of the
Construct → Measure → Score model. The psychometric “back end” (M → S) is
immaterial and, much worse, misleading. Failure to understand the different focus of
the two measurement methods has led editors and reviewers – for example at JM and
also JMR – to regularly request that the present author “prove empirically” that
C-OAR-SE produces more valid measures; in other words, they want the author to
prove that C-OAR-SE is superior by using the very procedure that it is designed to
replace! That’s both philosophically (logically) impossible and it’s beside the point,
because Churchill’s procedure is anyway fatally flawed. C-OAR-SE theory is based
on rational analysis. As with mathematics and logic, to ask for empirical proof is to
ask for the unnecessary, and to demand that C-OAR-SE theory be justified by any
empirical method, such as psychometrics or statistics, is to miss the purpose and value
of the new procedure.

2.2 Detailed comparison
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A detailed comparison of Churchill’s method and the C-OAR-SE method is
provided in a summary table (Table 1). The main differences are explained in the
remaining sections of the first part of this article.

Table 1 here

2.3 Measurement theory comparison
The Churchill and C-OAR-SE methods differ fundamentally in their
assumptions about measurement theory. As indicated in the table, the differences
pertain to their respectively underlying true-score theories, their scope of application,
and the way they define and assess validity and reliability.
True-score theory. Churchill’s (and also Nunnally’s) measurement theory claims
to be based on what may be called the “revised” true-score model, which is Observed
score = True score + Systematic error + Random error (Churchill, 1979, p. 65).
However, the second term in this model, “systematic error,” is not clearly defined by
Churchill and neither is it referred to subsequently in his article. In effect, his
measurement procedure falls back on the “old,” or “classical test-theory,” true-score
model (see Spearman, 1904, and Lord and Novick, 1968) in which there is no term
called “systematic error.” The “old” true-score model is Observed score = True score
+ Random error, where “random error” (deviations from the true score) is attributed
entirely to transient and presumably randomly occurring mistakes made by the rater.
Churchill’s methods of establishing validity and reliability (see below) depend on
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correlations of the scores, and the correlation statistic is based on the “old” true-score
model in which there is only “random error.”
C-OAR-SE, in contrast, is based on a new true-score model (also see Rossiter
2010), which is Observed score = True score + Measure-induced distortion + Rater
error. Measure-induced distortion is roughly what other true-score theorists refer to as
“systematic error” (although one type of distortion due to an overdiscriminating
answer scale does look “random”) and it is caused by the measure, specifically by its
inadequate content validity. Rater error, the final term in the new true-score model, is
the same as “random error” in the old or classical true-score model, but rater error will
be negligible if the measure is highly content-valid because a highly content-valid
measure produces very little or ideally no distortion and raters are most unlikely to
make mistaken ratings when using such a measure. The Observed score from a highly
content-valid measure should therefore be the True score.
Scope of application. Churchill’s theory is “only applicable to multi-item
measures” (p. 66). Churchill advocates the use of multiple-item measures for all
constructs, stating plainly that “marketers are much better served with multi-item
than single-item measures of their constructs” (p. 66). His recommendation to always
use multiple items to measure a construct – a recommendation accepted and followed
by most if not all academic marketing and social science researchers – inadvertently
eliminates measures of the most commonly measured construct in the social sciences
and marketing: beliefs, or as marketing scientists call them, perceptions. A belief or
perception is always uncontestably measured with a single item. And indeed, all
“basic” constructs – called “doubly concrete” constructs in C-OAR-SE theory – are
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most validly measured with a single item. This was suggested in the study by
Bergkvist and Rossiter (2007) and confirmed in a reanalysis by Rossiter and
Bergkvist (2009).
Even further-reaching in C-OAR-SE theory is the realization that all
“complex” or “abstract” constructs – the type of construct to which Churchill’s
theory refers – are no more than aggregations of “doubly concrete” constructs (beliefs
mostly) and these are each measured uncontestably with a single item. This point
was made most clearly in the article by Rossiter and Bergkvist (2009). Take as an
example the “abstract” construct COMPANY A’s SERVICE QUALITY AS
PERCEIVED BY ITS CUSTOMERS, as measured by the now-standard
SERVQUAL questionnaire (see Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry, 1994). Each of
the 21 items in SERVQUAL is a belief and therefore is a “doubly concrete” construct
that requires only a single item to measure it. Item 21 in the 1994 version of
SERVQUAL, for example, is the belief that “Company A has convenient business
hours,” and this, like the other 20, is a single-item measure. Service quality
researchers then proceed – unnecessarily – to factor-analyze these single items,
reducing the scores to five “factors” or “dimensions” that have no real-world
applicability. How, for instance, can the marketer possibly implement the
SERVQUAL factor of “Responsiveness”? Answer: Only by going back to the original
single items. But worse, the marketer would not realize that important
“responsiveness” items may have been omitted because they didn’t “load”
significantly on the “Responsiveness factor.” This illustrates a major problem with
Churchill’s procedure, which is that, like all classic psychometric approaches, it
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assumes that all attributes are “reflective.” The attributes of “Responsiveness,”
“Empathy” and so forth in SERVQUAL are clearly “formed,” not reflective – formed
from the most prevalent specific behaviors that make up the attribute. For
“Responsiveness,” for example, specific formative behaviors would include answering
customers’ phone calls promptly and fixing problems fully. Prevalent attributeforming behaviors – items – cannot be discarded merely because their scores are not
“unidimensional” with the other items’ scores. The reflective measurement model devalidates multiple-item measures.
In their reliance on the reflective measurement model, researchers have missed
or preferred to ignore Armstrong’s (Armstrong 1967; Armstrong and Soelberg 1968)
devastating demonstrations of the misleading nature of factor analysis. In
Armstrong’s two studies, meaningful “factors” were obtained using random numbers
as inputs. Armstrong revealed the input data were random only after the “results”
had been plausibly written up. Factor analysis and its principal components
variation cannot be trusted (see also Ehrenberg, 1975) and this “data reduction”
technique should not be used.
Churchill’s procedure therefore has limited scope. The C-OAR-SE procedure
has no limitation, applying to all types of construct, including the most common
construct in the social sciences – beliefs or perceptions – which are always measured
with single items.

2.4 Validity: Churchill vs. C-OAR-SE
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As is conventional in psychometric theory, Churchill separates validity into
content validity, construct validity, and predictive validity. In C-OAR-SE theory,
only content validity matters. Whereas Churchill concurs that high content validity of
a measure is essential, he conceptualizes content validity inadequately and he
unjustifiably assumes it to be achieved in steps 1 and 2 of his procedure (see shortly).
Content validity. High content validity of the measure is essential in
C-OAR-SE theory and is the only requirement for a measure. What, though, does
“high content validity” mean? Well, according to an informative study by Mosteller
and Youtz (1990) the average person takes the adjective “high” to mean just over
80% probability. Quantitatively oriented readers, therefore, can take “high content
validity” to mean that the semantic content of the measure must have at least 80%
correspondence, or “overlap,” with the semantic content of the construct as defined.
The semantic overlap could be quantified by anyone familiar with a thesaurus and
with Osgood’s (see Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum, 1957) measure of connotative
meaning. Qualitatively, however, high content validity in C-OAR-SE is simply a
matter of making a rational argument – an expert-judgment appeal to readers (see
Nunnally, 1978, p. 94) that the descriptor “high” is warranted for the content validity
of the measure.
Content validity is defined in C-OAR-SE theory as consisting of two parts:
item-content validity (which means coming as close as possible to semantic identity
between the content of the construct, as defined by the researcher, and the content of
the question part of the measure) and answer-scale validity (which means freedom
from measure-induced distortions of the true score caused by semantic confusion
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when the rater is responding to the answer part of the measure). This two-part
definition of content validity is unique to C-OAR-SE.
Construct validity. So-called “construct validity” in Churchill’s theory, as in
Nunnally’s, is seen as separate from, and apparently more important than, content
validity. (Churchill states, on p. 70, that a measure that is content-valid “may or
may not produce a measure which has construct validity.”) Churchill, and Nunnally,
advocate the usual statistical psychometric approach to establishing construct
validity, which is Campbell and Fiske’s (1959) multitrait-multimethod, or MTMM,
analysis. But MTMM analysis focuses on the scores from measures. In MTMM,
“convergent validity” and “discriminant validity” are claimed for the measure
without considering the construct (see the structure-of-measurement model in Figure 1
earlier). By ignoring the measure’s correspondence with the construct, MTMM
analysis therefore fails to consider the measure’s content validity.
Not revealed by psychometricians is that the very term “construct validity” is
a logical impossibility – a misnomer. Nunnally (1978) appears to realize the illogic
(see p. 109) but ignores it and Churchill (1979) obviously does not realize it because in
his article he elevates “construct validity” over all other forms of validity. But one
can never validate a construct. A construct is always just a subjective theoretical
definition – a matter of opinion, not provable fact. A construct can be “reasonable or
unreasonable” (in its definition) but it can’t be “true or false” (validated).
Validity refers only to a measure: it is the extent to which a measure “measures
what it is supposed to measure” (a definition attributed to Kelley 1927; and see
almost any social science research textbook for acknowledgement that this is the real
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meaning of “validity” – followed by most textbook writers’ immediate departures
into other “psychometric” meanings of the term!). What the measure is supposed to
measure is the construct. A measure has high validity – high truth value – only if its
content closely represents the content of the defined construct.
Predictive validity. Churchill further postulates that predictive validity is
important to establish for a measure. In his theory, Churchill appears to regard
predictive validity as essential (see his discussion, on p. 72 of his 1979 article, of
whether a measure “behaves as expected”). However, predictive validity can at most
be desirable, not essential. Predictive validity cannot logically be essential because
validity, by definition, is internal to the measure, and so validity cannot be
established “externally” by showing that scores on the measure predict those from
another measure.
Churchill also misses Nunnally’s observation (1978, p. 91) that predictive
validity applies only to measures of predictor constructs. Measures of criterion
constructs can be validated only in terms of their content validity.
Predictive validity is also much more complicated to establish than Churchill
realizes, because it requires comparison of the observed correlation (called the
“validity coefficient”; see Cronbach 1961) with an estimate of the population
correlation between scores on the predictor measure and scores on the criterion
measure (see Rossiter 2002b, pp. 327-328, and also see the study by Rossiter and
Bergkvist 2009 in which two population correlations are estimated).
Nomological validity. So-called “nomological” or “theoretical network”
validity (the main rationale for “structural equation modeling” – see Bagozzi 1994) is
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just another form of predictive validity. Nomological validity, too, is merely desirable,
not essential, for a measure.

2.5 Reliability: Churchill vs. C-OAR-SE
There are two principal types of reliability written about in the measurement
literature: test-retest reliability, or stability, which applies to all measures, and
internal-consistency reliability, which applies only to multiple-item measures. Both
forms of reliability are defined by psychometricians as the absence of “random error”
(i.e., rater error) and thereby adhere to the old true-score model. Both forms ignore
possible “systematic error” caused by the measure – that is, measure-induced distortion
– which is a key term in the new true-score model presented earlier.
Test-retest reliability. Churchill states categorically that test-retest reliability
“should not be used” (p. 70). This type of reliability was also dismissed by Rossiter in
the initial version of C-OAR-SE (2002b, p. 328). Both theorists’ reason for rejecting
test-retest reliability was that even a totally non-valid measure could produce highly
similar scores on the retest. However, in the new version of C-OAR-SE theory (here,
and in Rossiter, 2010) it is recognized that the converse does not hold. The measure
must produce stable scores when readministered to the same respondents over a short
retest interval, otherwise the results from any one-off empirical study using the
measure cannot be trusted. Highly stable test-retest scores are guaranteed only for a
measure that has high item-content validity and high answer-scale validity – that is,
high overall content validity.
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Internal-consistency reliability. Churchill puts the entire emphasis in his theory
of reliability on internal-consistency reliability. Internal-consistency (of scores from a
multiple-item measure) is invariably assessed by calculating Cronbach’s (1951)
coefficient alpha, symbolized α. In the original C-OAR-SE article, Rossiter (2002b)
supported the use of coefficient α – preceded by the use of Revelle’s little-known
(1979) coefficient β – in two of the six cells of the theory. These were the cells in
which a “reflective attribute,” which Rossiter (2002b) called an eliciting attribute, is
part of the construct. The most radical update in C-OAR-SE theory (here, and see
Rossiter, 2010) is to reject the “reflective” model (which means that all abstract
attributes now follow the “formative” model). This change also makes internal
consistency – and with it the psychometric idea of unidimensionality – unnecessary
and indeed harmful. The harmful aspect is that the attainment of high internal
consistency always lowers the content validity of the measure.
The new proposition in C-OAR-SE that all abstract attributes follow the
formative model – that is, that the total abstract attribute score is formed from its
attribute component scores – is radical given that several leading theorists (e.g.,
Borsboom, 2005) do not regard the “formative” approach to be legitimate
“measurement” (because they cling to the unnecessary psychometric concept of
“unidimensionality” – see Rossiter, 2010, for a critique of this concept). The new
proposition therefore requires some justification. The argument is twofold.
First, all abstract attributes (an abstract attribute has more than one clear
meaning) must be classified on the basis of theory as either a formed, achieved
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attribute or an eliciting, dispositional attribute. The classification cannot be made
empirically, contrary to the approach advocated by psychometricians such as
Diamantopoulos and Sigauw (2006) and see Rossiter (2008) for a thorough
dismantling of their empirical approach. The majority of abstract attributes in
marketing are formed. MARKET ORIENTATION, SERVICE QUALITY, and
CUSTOMER BRAND EQUITY are major examples of “formative” constructs that
are invariably measured wrongly as “reflective” (you can tell this easily if “factor
analysis” or alternatively “principal components analysis,” the favored statistical tool
of psychometricians, is mentioned in the measure-development section of the article).
All three JM articles critiqued later in this article make this mistake of imposing the
reflective measurement model on the measure of their new construct. Very few
abstract attributes in marketing are genuinely “eliciting,” or “dispositional,” in that
they are something internal (to the company or to the person) that causes (mental or
overt) behavioral responses. CORPORATE VALUES and INDIVIDUAL
PERSONALITY TRAITS are among the rare examples of dispositional attributes.
Second – and here’s the more subtle argument – even though the component
behaviors are caused, or “reflected out,” by the dispositional attribute, they cannot be
“sampled randomly” as assumed in the notion of “domain sampling” which underlies
the reflective measurement model. Instead, the component behaviors must be in the
measure, as items, by definition. This argument is well illustrated by carefully
considering the nature of the attribute called MARKET ORIENTATION, which
Narver and Slater (1990) defined as consisting of five components: Customer
orientation, Competitor orientation, Interfunctional orientation, Long-term
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orientation, and Profitability orientation. In the initial C-OAR-SE article, Rossiter
(2002b) argued that MARKET ORIENTATION is a formed attribute – being
something that the COMPANY achieves. If so, all five components must be
represented in the measurement items (whether the five components should be
equally or differentially “weighted” is another decision – a theoretical, not an
empirical, decision). However, it could alternatively be argued, in the up-front theory
section of the researchers’ article, that MARKET ORIENTATION is a disposition – a
“company trait” if you like – that manifests itself or “reflects out” on the five sets of
component behaviors. If so, again all five components must be represented in the
measurement items because that is how the MARKET ORIENTATION attribute is
defined conceptually. (By the way, no MARKET ORIENTATION researcher from
Narver and Slater to the present has defined it this way – as a corporate disposition or
“company trait.”) But what is not realized by later researchers is that Narver and
Slater (1990) imposed a reflective measurement model on the scores from their
original large list of conforming to the five components items and dropped two of the
components, Long-term orientation and Profit orientation, from the final measure
because neither resulted in an “internally consistent” (by coefficient alpha) “factor.”
Their actual MARKET ORIENTATION measure represents only three of the five
defined components: Market orientation, Competitor orientation, and Interfunctional
orientation. They and all subsequent researchers using Narver and Slater’s (1990) 15item MARKET ORIENTATION scale are thus using a measure that does not
correspond semantically with the construct definition. Adoption of the C-OAR-SE
method by later researchers (it was published in 2002, well after Narver and Slater’s
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1990 article) would have prevented this major content omission because C-OAR-SE,
as made clear by the C → M → S model earlier, is all about content validity, which
requires high semantic correspondence between the construct and the measure. No
matter whether the MARKET ORIENTATION attribute was conceptualized as
“formed” or “reflective,” all five components would be properly represented in the
measure if the C-OAR-SE procedure were followed.
When you think about it, therefore, all abstract attributes are formed from a
measurement standpoint (formed from their predefined components). The radical
“fallout” from careful thought is that the reflective measurement model is entirely
misleading and should be abandoned.
Precision reliability. C-OAR-SE theory adds another form of reliability much
valued by social science practitioners: precision-of-score reliability (abbreviated as
precision reliability in the comparison table). Churchill (1979) hints at this form of
reliability when he dismisses single-item measures. His argument is that the usual
seven-step rating scale accompanying a single-item measure produces imprecise scores
because “the same scale position is unlikely to be checked in successive
administrations” (p. 66). This may be true but this is test-retest (un)reliability, not
precision reliability.
In C-OAR-SE theory, precision reliability is much closer to what practitioners
know to be a very important applied consideration, which is the confidence that can
be placed in an observed score. “Precision” in this particular meaning of reliability
depends mainly on the sample size of observations and therefore can be estimated
closely enough for practical purposes from “lookup” tables which give generalized
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95% confidence intervals for various sample sizes (see Rossiter and Percy 1987;
Rossiter and Percy 1997; Rossiter and Bellman 2005; and Rossiter, 2010). These
lookup tables are what opinion pollsters use in newspaper reports and sometimes in
TV reports to predict elections and if the precision in lookup tables is accurate enough
for measuring important societal and political knowledge it is surely good enough for
assessing the incidence of marketing knowledge.
All precision estimates depend on using content-valid measures in the first
place. If the measures are highly content-valid, then the statistical precision of scores
derived from them becomes relevant for proper interpretation of the findings.

2.6 Step-by-step comparison
A brief comparison of the other major differences between the C-OAR-SE
procedure and the six steps in Churchill’s (1979) measure-development procedure
concludes the first half of this article. The comparison is made on the basis of
Churchill’s six steps.
1. Define the construct. Churchill – as all other psychometricians do – defines
the construct in terms of its attribute only. Churchill encourages this when he makes
the incorrect (from the C-OAR-SE perspective) comment on p. 65 of his article that
“…it is the attributes of objects that are measured and not the objects themselves.”
In C-OAR-SE, the construct must be defined in terms of the object to be rated, the
attribute it is to be rated on, and the rater entity doing the rating.
McGuire (1989), in his “object-on-attribute” conceptualization of constructs,
explains why a construct is necessarily “underspecified” if the object is not included in
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the construct definition. It follows that the measure, also, must represent the object
of the construct – for example, the measure must include an illustration of the
product if such products are usually chosen by brand recognition, or must include the
phonetically appropriate name of the product or service if it is usually chosen by
brand recall – see Rossiter and Percy (1987, 1997) or Rossiter and Bellman (2005).
Object misrepresentation is one of the most common measurement mistakes made by
researchers. It is a mistake of low item-content validity.
The attribute is only the second element of the construct. It, too, must be
correctly represented in the measure. Churchill’s assumption that all attributes have
multiple meanings and therefore are “multidimensional” automatically excludes from
his theory all single-meaning attributes. Single-meaning attributes are the type of
attribute represented in the most common construct in the social sciences – beliefs or
perceptions.
The third element of the construct, the rater entity, does not appear in the
measure, but must be included in the definition. For example, service quality
researchers should define as two constructs MANAGER-RATED service quality of the
organization, on the one hand, and CUSTOMER-RATED service quality of the
organization, on the other. These two constructs represent the main service-quality
“gap” that marketers must manage. Most meta-analyses fail to identify the various
different rater entities (see Rossiter, 2010, for examples of this). Rater-entity
differences are a major reason for reaching the unsatisfactory conclusion of “mixed”
findings.

23
2. Generate items. The second step in Churchill’s procedure is item generation,
which always means the generation of multiple items. In Churchill’s procedure,
candidate items are either generated from qualitative “open-ended” interviews with a
sample of raters, or else far more often they are borrowed from other researchers’
measures. The second of these methods of item generation can now be readily seen as
flawed given the near certainty that previous measures will have questionable content
validity (low item-content validity) as well as unknown stability or test-retest
reliability (low stability is largely caused by low answer-scale validity, which leads
raters to mark the scale differently each time).
The former method of generating candidate items by conducting open-ended
interviews with a sample of raters is the “textbook correct” method (it’s correct even
for a well-established object and attribute, because the rater entity might be different).
However, this method is inappropriate for generating an item or items for a
“psychological” construct – defined in Rossiter (2010) as a construct that is not selfreportable by raters (examples in psychology would be the Freudian constructs of
REPRESSION and PROJECTION; the increasingly popular construct in psychology
and also in consumer behavior of IMPLICIT ATTITUDE; and the very important
and inadequately measured set of constructs in both disciplines known as MOTIVES,
noting that qualitative research was originally called “motivation research”). The
item or items used in the measure of a psychological construct can be decided only by
the researcher, and raters are of no help.
In fact, the final item, or items, selected for the other type of construct – called
a “perceptual” construct in Rossiter (2010) because it is self-reportable by the rater –
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must also be decided on ultimately by the researcher, although pretesting of itemwording with raters is a good idea if the researcher is unsure of “consumer language”
terms for the attributes.
3. Purify the measure. Churchill’s notion of “purifying” the (multiple-item)
measure is a nice-sounding but misleading religious metaphor. In the “purification”
step, items are deleted from the randomly generated pool of candidate items if their
scores fail to correlate positively with each other and with the total score on a
“latent” and entirely artifactual, statistically derived “factor” emerging from the
usually performed factor analysis or principal components analysis of candidate
items’ scores. The fact that an object receives high scores on, say, the item “Likable”
and the item “Honest” (i.e., their scores are highly correlated) does not mean that
there exists a real attribute labeled “LIKABILITY/HONESTY” – yet this is what a
factor analyst will infer! The five SERVQUAL “dimensions” of Responsiveness,
Empathy, etc., are typical examples of the factor-analysis fallacy. To make matters
worse, further items may be deleted if the high-loading items fail to produce a high
coefficient alpha. This “purification” step is really a “contamination” step, because a
multiple-item measure with poorer content validity is always the result when defining
items are deleted or when their scores are summarized as an artificial “factor.”
There is no “purification” step in C-OAR-SE. An abstract object or an abstract
attribute means, of course, that a multiple-item measure must be employed, but the
multiple items are “in there” by definition, having previously been selected –
ultimately by the researcher – as corresponding to the components in the definition.
Each item is based on prior certification by the researcher that the item has high
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item-content validity, that is, high semantic correspondence with its predefined
component in the researcher’s construct definition. Scores from the items are never to
be considered in assessing the validity of the measure (see the C → M → S model
earlier) and thus no “purification” step is needed.
4. Assess reliability. As pointed out earlier in this article, “reliability” in
Churchill’s theory refers solely to internal-consistency reliability (as estimated by
calculating coefficient α from the items’ scores) and applies only to a multiple-item
measure. But, in C-OAR-SE theory, internal consistency is irrelevant and misleading
for (scores on) a multiple-item measure because the total score on such a measure is
always formed from the scores obtained on the items measuring the predefined
components and these scores do not need to be internally consistent or at all correlated
(although they usually will be, given that the attribute components are components
of the main attribute).
In C-OAR-SE, there are only two types of reliability that matter. These are
stability reliability and precision reliability. They were explained in the section on
“reliability” earlier.
5. Assess construct validity. The first sub-heading under step 5 in Churchill’s
(1979) article, the step describing “construct validity,” is “Correlations With Other
Measures.” In this section, Churchill goes into great detail to exemplify how the
correlational theory of construct validity known as multitrait-multimethod analysis, or
MTMM, an analysis procedure invented by Campbell and Fiske (1959), is to be
applied to the measure. However, a founding principle of C-OAR-SE theory,
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represented in the C → M → S model (see earlier figure), is that a measure cannot be
validated in relation to a construct by examining the scores obtained from the
measure (in the form of the scores’ convergent, discriminant, or predictive
correlations, coefficient alpha, or any other statistic). In C-OAR-SE theory, the
concept of “construct validity” is replaced by content validity.
Content validity requires a rational argument – made by the researcher as
theorist if a “psychological” construct and as an expert in colloquial consumer
language if a “perceptual” construct, aided if necessary in either case by a couple of
expert colleagues – that there is very good semantic correspondence between the
construct as defined and the measure as selected (item-content validity) plus
certification by the researcher, perhaps aided by a pretest with a small sample of
raters, that the answer scale selected for the measure has very good “expressability”
(high answer-scale validity). C-OAR-SE measurement items require only a rational
supporting argument attesting that they are highly content-valid. Most researchers are
evidently capable of doing this content analysis on their own. Hardesty and Bearden
(2004), for instance, estimate that multiple expert judges were used for only about
20% of the approximately 200 new measures reported in Bearden and Netemeyer’s
(1999) handbook of marketing measures – that is, in about 80% of cases, the
researcher alone designed the new measure.
6. Develop norms. The final step in Churchill’s measure-development
procedure is to “develop norms” for scores obtained from various applications of the
measure. As he points out (on p. 72), this final step is necessary only if the researcher
wants to compare the scores of individuals – or the scores of individual objects, such as
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a company, a brand, an ad, or celebrity or politician – with some population average
score (the “norm”). But few studies in the social sciences have this purpose and so it
is not a necessary step. Norms do have their uses, however. Psychologists often use
norms in research on individual abilities; well-known examples include the testing of
GENERAL MENTAL ABILITY (called GENERAL INTELLIGENCE or “IQ”
before the political correctness movement descended upon us) and the measuring of
individuals’ psychological PERSONALITY TRAITS, which are assessed for the
“clinical” population relative to their average levels in the “normal” population.
Marketing practitioners sometimes use norms when they use marketing models (e.g.,
the BASS DIFFUSION MODEL, and the ORDER-OF-ENTRY → MARKET
SHARE MODEL; see Urban and Star, 1991, and also Rossiter and Percy, 1987 and
1997).
The greatest need for normative estimates for measures in the social sciences
has been surprisingly overlooked. Normative (i.e., population-based) correlation
coefficients are needed for assessing predictive validity, because good predictive
validity means coming close to the true correlation, not searching statistically for the
highest correlation. Only a few researchers in psychology have attempted to estimate
population correlation coefficients. Important attempts are for the correlation
between ATTITUDE and subsequent BEHAVIOR (Krauss, 1995) and for HABIT
and INTENTION as dual predictors of BEHAVIOR (Ouellette and Wood, 1998). In
marketing, Rossiter and Berkgvist (2009) have attempted to estimate the true
population correlation for AD LIKING predicting BRAND ATTITUDE and then
BRAND ATTITUDE predicting BRAND PURCHASE INTENTION. All estimates
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of population correlations rely on meta-analyses – and on the ability of the researcher
to correct for problems with meta-analyses, of which differing measures are the main
problem (another big problem is that college students are often the only rater entity, a
problem pointed out long ago by Peterson, Albaum, and Beltramini, 1985). The
measure-difference problem would be solved if all social science researchers adopted
the C-OAR-SE measurement procedure. The rater-entity difference problem can only
be solved by judiciously seeking out practitioner studies based on broader populations
of respondents (see Rossiter and Percy, 1987 and 1997, for numerous examples).

3. C-OAR-SE critique of three JM studies
In this last part of the article, the main defined construct and measure in three
recent articles selected from the Journal of Marketing, the most prestigious journal in
our field, are critiqued from a C-OAR-SE perspective. Most of the researchers
involved are very experienced and have previous publications in JM and in other
leading marketing research journals. The critiques do not criticize the researchers –
except obliquely for failing to adopt the C-OAR-SE procedure, which was published
well before these studies were conducted. The sole purpose of the critiques is to make
readers realize that much of the marketing knowledge in strategic principles and
empirical generalizations derived from studies using what Leeflang, Bijmolt, van
Doorn, Hanssens, van Heerde, Verhoef, and Wierenga (2009) called “soft data” socialscience constructs is at the very least questionable.
The critiques are organized in terms of five C-OAR-SE-based criteria that
should be discernible from the first part of the present article. (These five criteria

29
provide a useful summary of the C-OAR-SE steps – that is, the steps that should be
followed in designing or choosing a measure.) The criteria are:
1. Comprehensive conceptual definition of the construct in terms of object,
attribute, and rater entity
2. Close semantic correspondence of measurement item, or items, with the
construct as defined (high item-content validity)
3. Good “expressability” of the answer options (high answer-scale validity)
4. All major defining items retained in the measure
5. Correct scoring rule applied to the scores
These five criteria are hierarchical. In decision-theory terms, they form an
“elimination-by-aspects” decision rule, based on C-OAR-SE, for accepting the
measure as valid – or, of course, for rejecting it.

3.1 “Brand Experience” (Brakus, Schmitt, and Zarantonello, 2009)
In their JM article of May 2009, researchers Brakus, Schmitt, and
Zarantonello set out to measure a new construct that they called “brand experience.”
1. Adequate conceptual definition of the construct. Brakus et al. (2009) defined
the construct of BRAND EXPERIENCE as “sensations, feelings, cognitions, and
behavioral responses evoked by brand-related stimuli that are part of a brand’s design
and identity, packaging, communications, and environments” (p. 52). In terms of
C-OAR-SE theory, this is a mostly adequate conceptual definition because it specifies
the object’s components (the Brand, its Packaging, its Communications, and its Retail
environment) and also the components of the abstract attribute of brand experience
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(Sensations, Feelings, Cognitions, and Behavioral responses). Their definition fails
only to specify the rater entity in the construct (which can be inferred to be ALL
CONSUMERS AWARE OF THE BRAND, whether or not they are customers of the
brand).
2. High item-content validity. The most serious problem occurs in the
researchers’ measure of the construct. Without realizing that they had done so, the
researchers developed the most valid measure of the construct of a “brand experience”
(most valid according to C-OAR-SE) in their pre-study. Examples of BRAND
EXPERIENCES (plural, note) obtained in open-ended questioning for some of the
brands they studied are reproduced in my Table 3 (from their Table 1, on p. 56).
These verbatim self-reports clearly are brand experiences.

Table 3 about here

However, these “sensations,” “feelings,” “cognitions,” and “behavioral
responses” were measured in relation to the Brand-name only. This severely biases
the object component in the measure because it omits the other object components
from the construct as defined by the researchers, which were the brand’s Packaging,
Communications, and Retail environments (although the latter was obviously the
object referred to in the open-ended question about Starbucks – see table).
The rater entity for the pre-study measure was also biased. The raters should
have been ALL CONSUMERS WHO HAVE HEARD OF THE BRAND. Instead,
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the researchers interviewed only consumers who use the brand and therefore are more
likely to have “brand experiences” to report.
But the instrument that the researchers developed to measure BRAND
EXPERIENCE for the main study bears no resemblance to the construct as defined.
What the researchers did was to generate items that do not measure consumers’ actual
sensations, etc., elicited by the brand (and by its packaging, communications, and
retail environment) but instead measure consumers’ vague assertions that they had
such experiences in general. The 12 completely general items making up the
researchers’ BRAND EXPERIENCE measure (see their Table 2, p. 58) are
reproduced in Table 4 for the reader’s perusal. Compare the completely general item
content of the items in Table 4 with the specific contents of the open-ended reports of
BRAND EXPERIENCES summarized in my Table 3 earlier. Can you see the
problem? If not, try answering 12 BRAND EXPERIENCE questions yourself for,
say, the Nike brand (“yes” or “no” will do for answers) and then compare those
answers with the example answers for Nike in the previous table. The 12 items have
zero content overlap with the construct, which was defined as specific experiences.
This is the “fatal flaw” in their study. The main-study measure cannot be made
acceptable by appealing, as the researchers did, to the “good statistics” it produces.

Table 4 about here

3. Summary evaluation. Brackus and colleagues did not in fact discover a new
construct called “brand experience.” They merely created an artificial general name
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for specific experiences in the form of consumers’ beliefs and associations to brands –
constructs that have been studied many times before.

3.2 “Customer Need Knowledge” (Homburg, Wieseke, and Bornemann, 2009)
In their JM article of July 2009, researchers Homburg, Wieseke, and
Bornemann introduced a new construct that they called “customer need knowledge”
and proposed a new measure of it.
1. Adequate conceptual definition of the construct. Homburg et al. (2009)
defined the new construct of CUSTOMER NEED KNOWLEDGE as “the extent to
which a frontline employee can correctly identify a given customer’s hierarchy of
needs” (p. 65). However, the theoretical background they supplied leading up to their
construct definition concerns “the accuracy of interpersonal perception” (p. 65) and it
is semantically inaccurate to label the attribute in this construct as involving
knowledge. A more appropriately descriptive label would be “Frontline employees’
accuracy of perceiving the customer’s needs,” and a shorter attribute-only label would
be CUSTOMER-NEED PERCEPTION (restoring the clarifying hyphen so often
omitted today).
2. High item-content validity. The “fatal flaw” in the researchers’ measure of
CUSTOMER-NEED KNOWLEDGE occurs in terms of the next C-OAR-SE
criterion: high item-content validity. The researchers asked a sample of (travel
agency) frontline employees, as well as each employee’s last customer, to rank-order
six “needs” (reproduced verbatim in my Table 5). The “need” items have low content
validity. To begin with, the attributes are far too vague and general (especially
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“Brand,” “Convenience,” and “Price”) and then they are contrarily made too specific
(and therefore unrepresentative) by their accompanying examples. The example
parenthesized in each item is actually a component attribute, and a full set of them
should have been written as separate items. For instance, the attribute called
CONVENIENCE in any thorough study of services – and especially in practitioners’
studies – is always broken out into its components of Location convenience (for
personal visits), Opening-hours convenience (for personal visits and telephone
contact), and Perceived waiting time. Measurement of these components requires
three separate items, not one item as these researchers used.

Table 5 about here

Each customer was asked to rank the needs in order of “importan[ce] for you
with respect to travel booking” and then the employee who had served that customer
was asked to rank the same needs in order of their “importan[ce] for this customer”
(p. 78). The content-validity problem here is the ambiguity of the employee’s task
(the wording of the task instruction). It could be argued that the employee was not
asked to estimate or “perceive” the customer’s needs but rather to judge what those
needs should be (“importance for this customer”). The employee’s task instruction
does not unambiguously lead to a measure of the accuracy of employees’ perceptions
of the customer’s needs and so the measure does not correspond semantically well
enough to the construct as defined and will produce misleading results. This mistake
could have been avoided by pretesting of the instructions for the measure.
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The researchers’ use of low content-valid items (together with their use of
ranked rather than rated items, discussed below) was undoubtedly responsible for
their surprisingly weak findings with regard to the main construct. Customer-need
satisfaction is the strategic principle underlying the “marketing concept” (see any
marketing textbook) and yet these researchers found that the salesperson’s
CUSTOMER-NEED KNOWLEDGE was only weakly correlated with the customer’s
rated SATISFACTION with the visit and, even more practically important, only
weakly correlated with the customer’s rated WILLINGNESS TO PAY – that is, to
pay a higher price for holiday tour packages booked with this travel agent (although
the latter measure was half not-valid because two of the four items sought a
customer’s willingness to pay a higher price for airfares, which is ridiculous to expect
just because a particular travel agency booked the air travel). The average
correlation (i.e., the predictive-validity coefficient) for the employee’s CUSTOMERNEED KNOWLEDGE predicting the customer’s rated SATISFACTION was just r =
.16, and for CUSTOMER-NEED KNOWLEDGE predicting WILLINGNESS TO
PAY was also just r = .16. While such correlations are statistically significant, they
translate practically to very small effect sizes (Cohen, 1977, regards as a “small” effect
size a correlation of between r = .10 and r = .29). A practically minded marketing
manager would likely conclude from these results that it is hardly worth training
frontline employees to try to detect and fulfil “customer needs.” This is not the
conclusion the researchers intended, but their findings point to it.
3. High answer-scale validity. The third C-OAR-SE criterion requires good
“expressability” of the answer options (see especially Viswanathan, Sudman, and
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Johnson, 2004). The researchers’ measure of CUSTOMER-NEED KNOWLEDGE
fails on this criterion as well. Employees and their customers were asked to rank the
“needs” from 1 down to 6. But not only does the ranking procedure fail to indicate
whether any of the needs were absolutely important, it also precludes the likely answer
that several of the needs are equally important. The ranking method therefore both
“underdiscriminates” by not using absolute ratings and “overdiscriminates” by
forcing apart what could be tied ranks. With either problem, the answer method –
forced ordinal ranks – has unacceptably low content validity.
4. All major defining items retained. Were the main defining items included in
the CUSTOMER-NEED KNOWLEDGE measure (the fourth C-OAR-SE criterion)?
Again the answer is “no.” The researchers obtained the initial set of items from
qualitative interviews with three rater entities – MANAGERS, EMPLOYEES, and
CUSTOMERS – but only the last rater entity, CUSTOMERS, was relevant. (The
purpose of the measure was to gauge employees’ accuracy in perceiving their
customers’ needs.) The gathering of “customer needs regarding travel agency services”
(p. 59) as nominated by travel agency MANAGERS and by travel agency
EMPLOYEES goes outside the construct definition. The final list of six customer
needs (see above) therefore cannot be guaranteed to include only the main defining
items.
5. Correct scoring rule. The researchers chose what might be called a rankdifference scoring rule to derive the employees’ accuracy scores (i.e., their “customerneed knowledge” scores). The validity of ranking was questioned above but, this
aside, the actual scoring rule the researchers employed was appropriate. However, the
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researchers described its computation incorrectly (on p. 70) as “the sum of the
absolute differences between customer and employee rankings multiplied by –1.” The
maximum of the absolute differences between the two rank orders of six objects is 18
and the minimum is 0 (and the midpoint, which might indicate 50% accuracy on the
part of the employee, is 9). These scores should be reversed (not “multiplied by –1”)
so that a score of 18 indicates maximum accuracy and a score of 0 indicates complete
inaccuracy. The positive numbers in their Table 1 on p. 70 (mean scores of 7.8 and 8.5
observed in their two studies) suggest that they did in fact use reversal scoring despite
the wrongly reported formula, but this mistake may not be picked up by researchers
attempting to replicate the study.
More serious is that the mean scores of below and just under 9 suggest that the
average employee’s perceptual accuracy in gauging the customer’s needs did not reach
50%! This disappointing result may be due to the low validity of the task requested
of employees who, as noted earlier, quite possibly estimated the needs that the
customer should have rather than does have, and also may be due to the forced nature
of the ranking procedure.
6. Summary evaluation. Contrary to the title of Homburg et al.’s article, their
empirical findings lend very little support to the idea that managers should implement
“the marketing concept.” The findings seem to undermine the founding principle of
marketing! If uncritically accepted by readers of JM, they would result in the false
marketing knowledge that accurate detection of the customer’s needs is of little
importance.
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3.3 “Corporate Culture” (Tellis, Prabhu, and Chandy, 2009)
In their JM article of January 2009, researchers Tellis, Prabhu, and Chandy
studied the emergence of radical innovations across 17 of the world’s major
economies, using as their main predictor a construct they called “corporate culture.”
1. Adequate conceptual definition of the construct. Tellis et al. (2009) defined
CORPORATE CULTURE as “a core set of attitudes and practices that are shared by
members of the firm” (p. 6). Whereas this definition is admirable from a C-OAR-SEtheoretical perspective because it specifies the object of the construct (the FIRM) and
the rater entity (MEMBERS OF THE FIRM), the definition includes a questionable
conceptualization of the corporate culture attribute. Surely, CORPORATE
CULTURE refers to UNIVERSAL MANAGERIAL VALUES subscribed to by the
particular ORGANIZATION(as defined, for example, in JM by Deshpandé and
Webster, 1989). The fact that others have used a similarly loose and unacceptable
definition of the “corporate culture” attribute (other researchers are cited on p. 70)
does not justify its adoption here. The scientifically unacceptable practice of
justifying definitions – and measures – by an appeal to precedence is all too common
in the social sciences and especially in marketing.
The object of the construct of CORPORATE CULTURE was defined as
FIRMS IN GENERAL whereas the researchers confined their sample to
MANUFACTURING FIRMS. They selected manufacturing firms presumably to
give a higher chance of locating RADICAL INNOVATIONS – the product-based
dependent variable in their study – and thereby excluded SERVICE FIRMS, which
make up a majority of companies in some of the economies studied. Also, the rater
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entity in the construct was defined as MEMBERS OF THE FIRM whereas the
researchers interviewed only “the vice-president for innovation or technology or the
equivalent” (p. 9). This particular rater entity is hardly a representative “member of
the firm”! The technology V-P would likely give a favorably biased report of the
dependent variable.
2. High item-content validity. The “fatal flaw” in the measure, however, lies in
the low content validity of the components selected to represent the abstract attribute
of CORPORATE CULTURE. In a patently circular manner, the researchers
confined their measure to attitudes and practices that tapped only the firm’s
orientation toward the single value of INNOVATION, which overlaps greatly with
the dependent variable that the researchers were trying to predict (see Table 6). The
attitude components in their measure of CORPORATE CULTURE were Willingness
to cannibalize, Future market orientation, and Risk tolerance, and the behavioral
components were Encouragement of product champions, Incentives through
innovation, and a third vaguely labeled and mixed component that they labeled as
Internal markets. All the items in their CORPORATE CULTURE measure pertain
narrowly to innovation. Now look at the three items they used to measure the
dependent variable of RADICAL INNOVATION (also given in Table 6). There is a
high degree of overlap between the measures of predictor variable and the dependent
variable, which renders their “theory” predictively circular.

Table 6 about here
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What is simply not credible therefore, given this circularity, is that the scores
on the six measured components of CORPORATE CULTURE had such small
correlations with the scores on the dependent variable of what should have been
labeled RADICAL INNOVATION ATTITUDE (this variable was subjective; the
number of actual radically innovative products produced by the firm should have
been used as the dependent variable). The largest correlation was r = .25, for Risk
tolerance (see their Table 4 on p. 14), and the correlations for the other five also
favorably biased components ranged from .11 down to statistically zero (r = .06, n.s.).
The zero correlation was for the firm’s having Internal markets, a component that
was mis-measured – see the two sets of items, one labeled “Autonomy,” which has
nothing to do with “Internal markets,” and the other labeled “Internal competition,”
which does. These results are hardly convincing evidence for even the limited theory
that the researchers tested.
What the researchers should have done to achieve a highly content-valid
measure of CORPORATE CULTURE – more correctly labeled as
ORGANIZATIONAL VALUES – was, ideally, to have generated a new C-OAR-SEbased measure by qualitatively interviewing a cross-section of top managers. For
topic areas, they could use the comprehensive review of organizational behavior by
Gelfand, Erez, and Ayean (2007). Alternatively, they could have borrowed a more
comprehensive extant measure. The four-component, constant sum measure reported
in JM by Deshpandé, Farley, and Webster (1993) includes as only one option in one
component the item “Commitment to innovation and development.” With
Deshpandé et al.’s measure – which is closer to what C-OAR-SE would suggest – the
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researchers would have avoided the narrowness of their study and its patent
circularity.
3. The other C-OAR-SE criteria. The other mistakes of measurement made by
Tellis et al. are not trivial, although they pale in comparison with the major mistakes
identified above. There is the error of low answer-scale validity with the Likert answer
scales (see Rossiter 2002b) used for all items for all the constructs, and so commonmethods bias may have inflated the already weak correlations. There is the error of
omitting defining items in the predictor measure of CORPORATE CULTURE,
omissions made likely by assuming a reflective measurement model. Finally, there
are unjustified unequal weights of the components in the sum-scoring of the predictor
measure due to the differing number of items used per component.
4. Summary evaluation. Tellis and colleagues in their article did not
contribute any new marketing knowledge. Their study did not employ a valid
measure of the construct of “corporate culture” nor a valid measure of “radical
innovation,” and accordingly they recorded implausibly weak – and untrustable –
results. The lack of a contribution was due to inadequate construct definition and
poor selection of measures – mistakes that would not have occurred had the
researchers followed the C-OAR-SE procedure.

3.4 Summary statement regarding the selection of the three JM articles and the generality
of the critique
It is necessary to reemphasize that these three articles were purposefully but
representatively selected. The three articles were purposefully selected because each
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introduced a potentially important new construct – BRAND EXPERIENCE,
CUSTOMER-NEED PERCEPTION, and what might be reconceptualized as
CORPORATE INNOVATION CULTURE – together with a new measure of each
that was intended to contribute new marketing knowledge. It cannot reasonably be
contended that these were unrepresentative, atypical articles. All passed expert
review and were published in recent issues of our leading journal.
To further dispel the objection that I have been selective and that the
majority of our measures in marketing are “okay,” I add that all other empirical
articles based on “soft” measures of established marketing constructs post-dating
Churchill’s (1979) article could be similarly criticized, as could similar articles in all
other leading social science journals (those articles which post-date Nunnally’s highly
influential 1978 book on psychometric theory). I criticize – and correct – measures
published in a broad range of marketing, management, organizational behavior,
psychology, and sociology journals in my new book on C-OAR-SE.
This is no “straw man” critique of current social science measures. The
“psychometric” measurement problem is pandemic, and a cure is urgently needed.
The only cure is to adopt the C-OAR-SE method.

4. Conclusions
Social science researchers must get much braver – they must trust their ability
to define new constructs (and properly define old ones) and to design highly contentvalid measures of them. Amazing to many, all that is required is expertise in the
colloquial language – the semantics – to be used in the measure. To give a typical and
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very topical example: Is it still appropriate to describe a person – or a brand – as
“cool”? Can the same meaning possibly be captured by the “hot-cold” measure in a
battery of semantic-differential items? And what is the semantic opposite of “cool”?
It’s certainly not “hot,” which has an entirely different meaning when applied to a
person today and yet another meaning when applied to a brand as the object.
Researchers – especially academic researchers – fail to recognize the fundamentally
semantic nature of measurement. A Churchill-inspired researcher would likely borrow
or invent loose multiple items representing a vague and usually undefined “domain,”
put them in a questionnaire with faulty Likert answer scales, show that after deleting
some items the scores on the remaining items correlate and produce a “high alpha,”
and then claim to have captured the essence of “coolness”! This is exactly what
Churchill’s approach would tell the researcher to do – and the researcher is much more
likely to have the work published by following it. The C-OAR-SE researcher, in
contrast, would pick up these “soft” attributes during qualitative research (see
Rossiter 2009b; 2010). The C-OAR-SE researcher would realize that a literal single
item (e.g., “Brand X is cool. □ Yes □ No”) is perfectly valid for the particular rater
entity identified in the construct definition, then bravely argue for this measure and
use it. Hopefully the brave researcher will have become confident that this is the
right approach by reading and understanding the present article.
Also, what is not required for valid measurement of social science constructs is
expertise in the substantive field. Substantive expertise does not guarantee better
measures. The three JM studies criticized in the present article reveal this only too
well. Nor is expertise needed in quantitative methods and statistics – indeed, such
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expertise might be considered a liability given that C-OAR-SE is a nonstatistical
theory.
This last point is important to emphasize. Measurement of “soft” (i.e., social
science) constructs has been plagued by misplaced reliance on statistics – and
especially psychometrics. It is logically impossible for statistical manipulations to
substitute for the fundamentally conceptual task of defining constructs and the
semantic task of devising valid measures of them. Yet all social sciences, including
marketing, are being taken over by “scientism” (an exaggerated belief in the power of
scientist-invented techniques, most of all statistical techniques). One has only to
peruse the journals of today to see this, especially if the articles are compared with
articles on the same constructs written before the psychometricians took over. The
Journal of Marketing, from which the criticized studies were taken, is no exception.
The best articles on “soft” constructs were written in JM by theorists such as
Alderson, Bartels, Converse, Hunt, Kotler, Levitt, Levy, Stainton, Webster, Wensley,
and Zaltman – without resort to statistics.
Social science knowledge, and therefore much of our marketing knowledge, is
based on the presumption – and it is merely a presumption – that the measures of the
many “soft” constructs involved in the knowledge are highly valid. This means
highly content-valid. C-OAR-SE theory reveals that most if not all of our measures of
soft constructs have unacceptably low content validity. The problem applies especially
to measures of abstract (multiple-item) constructs but also to unnecessary multipleitem measures of concrete (single-item) constructs.
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The discomfiting conclusion to be drawn from this article is that most of our
measured knowledge in the social sciences, including marketing, is questionable, and
that a not unsubstantial amount of this knowledge – especially the recent “Churchillbased” knowledge – is wrong. There is no doubt that our whole approach to
measurement needs rethinking.
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Figure 1
GENERAL STRUCTURE-OF-MEASUREMENT MODEL

Construct
(conceptually
defined in terms of
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Table 1
COMPARISON OF CHURCHILL’S PROCEDURE AND THE C-OAR-SE
PROCEDURE
Measurement Theory
and Procedural Steps

Churchill

C-OAR-SE

True-score theory

Based on old true-score
model: Observed score = True
score + Random error.

Based on new true-score model:
Observed score = True score +
Measure-induced distortion +
Rater error.

Scope

Applicable only to “abstract”
(multiple-item) constructs.

Applies to all constructs,
“concrete” (single-item) and
“abstract” (multiple-item).

Validity

Content validity: Acknowledged as essential, but
inadequately defined and
handled in Churchill’s
measure-development
procedure.

Content validity: Essential, and
consists of (a) item-content
validity – semantic identity of
the construct and the measure;
and (b) answer-scale validity –
freedom from measure-induced
distortions. Established
rationally by expert judgment.

Construct validity: Seen as
essential, though should be
called measure validity.
Measure validity is wrongly
tested empirically by
examining convergent
correlations and discriminant
correlations with other
measures.

Construct validity: Meaningless,
because you cannot validate –
that is, prove the truth of – a
construct. You can only
validate a measure of a
construct, and then only by a
rational argument as to its high
content validity, not by any
empirical means.
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Predictive validity: Essential,
Predictive validity: Desirable
but not adequately explained. but not essential. Predictive
validity applies only to
predictor constructs. Criterion
constructs depend completely
on high content validity.
Reliability

Defined as absence of random
(i.e., rater) error in observed
scores, following the “old”
true-score model. But
operationalized only as
internal-consistency reliability
(coefficient alpha), which
assumes a multiple-item
measure.
Churchill mentions test-retest
reliability (stability) but
advises against using it.

Stability reliability: Essential,
observed score(s) must be
highly repeatable on a shortinterval retest.
Precision reliability: Accuracy
of observed score(s), which
depends mainly on sample size
and presumes a highly contentvalid measure. Precision
reliability should be reported
for observed scores on all the
main measures in the study.

1. Define the construct

Churchill defines the
construct in terms of the
attribute only. This mistake is
made by almost all
researchers.

C-OAR-SE construct definition
requires specification of (1) the
object to be rated, (2) the
attribute it is to be rated on, and
(3) the rater entity, who does the
rating. Constructs are
ultimately researcher-defined,
with no empirical assistance
other than pooled experts’
judgments when the researcher
is unsure.

2. Generate items

Candidate items are either
borrowed from others’
measures (of questionable
content validity and
unknown stability) or are
generated from qualitative
open-ended interviews, with
the item content mainly
decided by the raters.

Items must be decided on
ultimately by the researcher.
Raters’ inputs are necessary
only if the construct is
perceptual. Raters’ inputs are
not used if the construct is
psychological, i.e., not selfreportable.
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3. Purify the measure

Items are deleted from the
candidate pool if they don’t
correlate with other items and
with a “latent” statistical
factor and don’t contribute to
a high coefficient alpha.

Items are never deleted from the
defined set of items. The items
are based on a priori argued
item-content validity, not
derived from correlated scores
ex post.

4. Assess reliability

Only internal-consistency
reliability (coefficient α) is
calculated. Coefficient α is
legitimate (though
unnecessary) for a multipleitem measure but meaningless
for a single-item measure.
Nunnally’s (1978) minimum α
of .8 for a final measure is
very often ignored and the
measure is used anyway.

Stability reliability is assessed
by a short-interval test-retest.
High stability (a “doublepositive” repeat rate of .8 is the
acceptable minimum) is
required for the measure.

Construct validity is assessed
by the multitraitmultimethod correlational
procedure, which does not
relate to the construct itself.
In any case, construct
validation can only mean
measure validation.

Constructs are definitions, not
empirically testable
propositions. Only a measure
can be validated (with regard
to the defined construct). This
is content validity (high itemcontent validity and high
answer-scale validity) and high
content validity is essential.

Churchill also recommends
empirically testing the
measure for known-groups
discriminant validity, but this
is just another form of
predictive validity.

Predictive validity (of the
measure of a predictor
construct) is desirable only, not
essential. Predictive validity
requires prior high content
validity of the measure and a
population correlation estimate
against which to assess the
observed predictive validity
correlation.

5. Assess construct
validity

Precision reliability can be
estimated from the sample size
of raters in a particular study
by using “lookup” tables.
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6. Develop norms

Norms are misleadingly
recommended as a solution to
the problem of assessing
whether you’re getting true
scores from different answer
scales. Norms require a very
large and representative rater
sample – rarely attained in
academic studies, which
usually employ college
students, a nonrepresentative
rater entity.

Norms are needed in the form
of population correlations to
properly assess predictive
validity.
Norms based on measures with
low content validity, and
observed-score comparisons
based on a different measure
than the one in the norms, are
useless.
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Table 2
C-OAR-SE CRITIQUE OF MEASURES OF THE MAIN CONSTRUCTS IN
THREE TYPICAL JM ARTICLES

C-OAR-SE
Criterion

“Brand Experience”
(Brakus et al., JM,
May 2009)

“Customer Need
Knowledge”
(Homburg et al.,
JM, July 2009)

“Corporate
Culture” (Tellis et
al., JM, January
2009)

1. Adequate
conceptual
definition of the
construct in terms
of object,
attribute, and
rater entity

Yes. Though their
definition did not
clearly specify the
rater entity.

No. Construct’s
attribute is more
accurately labeled
“customer-need
perception.”

No. Construct’s
object should be
defined as
“organizational
values.”

2. Close semantic
correspondence of
measurement
item(s) with the
construct as
defined (high
item-content
validity)

No. The items’
objects and
attributes
completely miss the
component objects
and component
attributes of the
construct.

No. Attributecontent of items too
narrow and not
representative of the
component
attributes in the
construct. Task
instruction for raters
ambiguous with
regard to the
construct definition.

No. Items
selected so as to
guarantee a high
correlation
between the
predictor
measure’s scores
and the criterion
measure’s scores
(i.e., to circularly
prove the
researchers’
theory).

3. Good
“expressability”
of the answer
options (high
answer-scale
validity)

No. The 7-point
unipolar answer
scale probably
“overdiscriminates.”

No. Rank-ordering
of attributes
undoubtedly both
“underdiscriminates”
absolute differences
and “overdiscriminates” likely
tied ranks.

No. The bipolar
Likert answer
scales are faulty
on the “disagree”
side and
“reversed” items
cause rater errors.
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4. All major
defining items
retained in the
measure

No. Valid defining
items in qualitative
research are lost in
moving to the
quantitative
measure.

No. The items are
extracted from an
unreported set of
items from
qualitative research
in which two of three
rater entities are not
valid.

No. Factor
analysis and
coefficient alpha
are used to
wrongly delete
defining items.

5. Correct scoring
rule applied to the
scores

Yes. Sum-score rule
(but a simple
frequency count
could have been
used with the
qualitative measure
replacing the
quantitative
measure).

Yes. Rater-entity
difference rule (but
its computation is
wrongly described).

Yes. Sum-score
rule (but the
components
received unequal
weight due to
differing numbers
of items per
component).
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Table 3
SOME SPECIFIC BRAND EXPERIENCES OBTAINED OPEN-END IN THE
PRE-STUDY (BRAKUS ET AL., 2009)

Apple iPod

Nike



I love the touch and feel of the product



Makes me feel powerful



I am part of a “smarter” community



I feel inspired to start working out



I exercise more because of the iPod



I feel like an athlete



The store incites me to act – put on
the shoes, swing a bat

BMW

Starbucks



I feel young



Smells nice



I feel stylish



Visually warm



It’s just great to drive



Puts me in a better mood



The symbol of my success



It’s like being around a Barnes &
Noble crowd

MasterCard


Makes me think about the precious
things in life



I feel more youthful than when using
American Express or Visa
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Table 4
THE 12 COMPLETELY GENERAL AND IMPOSSIBLY VAGUE ITEMS IN THE
“BRAND EXPERIENCE” MEASURE (BRAKUS ET AL., 2009, MAIN STUDY)

1. This brand makes a strong impression on my visual or other senses.
2. I find this brand interesting in a sensory way.
3. This brand does not appeal to my senses.
4. This brand induces feelings and sentiments.
5. I do not have strong emotions for this brand.
6. This brand is an emotional brand.
7. I engage in physical actions and behaviors when I use this brand.
8. This brand results in bodily experiences.
9. This brand is not action oriented.
10. I engage in a lot of thinking when I encounter this brand.
11. This brand does not make me think.
12. This brand stimulates my curiosity and problem solving.

Note: The answer scale was 1 = “Not at all descriptive” to 7 = “Extremely
descriptive.”
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Table 5
THE SIX “NEEDS” – LISTED VERBATIM HERE WITH THEIR CONTRADICTORY
ITEM WORDING – IN THE STUDY OF “CUSTOMER NEED KNOWLEDGE”
(HOMBURG, ET AL., 2009)

1. Convenience (e.g., to have the least possible effort)
2. Price (e.g., to book travels with the best prices)
3. Service (e.g., the intensive consulting service by a travel agent)
4. Brand (e.g., to book brands of well-known travel companies)
5. Security (e.g., to have the security that the booked travel meets the expectations)
6. Shopping enjoyment (e.g., to have a travel planning that is fun and raises
pleasant anticipation)

Note: Answer method was ranking.
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Table 6
THE SIX UNACCEPTABLY NARROW COMPONENTS IN THE MEASURE OF
“CORPORATE CULTURE” AND THE SUBJECTIVE AND REDUNDANT ITEMS
USED TO MEASURE THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE OF “RADICAL
INNOVATION” (TELLIS ET AL., 2009)

Corporate Culture

Radical Innovation

(Predictor Variable)

(Dependent Variable)

A. Attitudes

Primary-measure items

1. Willingness to cannibalize (3 items)
2. Future market focus (4 items)
3. Risk tolerance (4 items)
B. Practices
4. Product champions (2 items)
5. Incentives for enterprise (2 items)

1. “Our firm rarely introduces products that a
radically different from existing products in
the industry” (reverse-scored)
2. “Our firm lags behind others in introducing
products based on radically new
technologies” (reverse-scored)
3. “We have no difficulty in introducing new
products that are radically different from
existing products in the industry”

6a. Autonomy (2 items)
6b. Internal competition (2 items)

Note: All items answered on bipolar Likert answer scales (wrongly scored unipolar as 1 =
“Strongly disagree,” through 7 = “Strongly agree”).

